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Uni-State Lawyers and Multinational
Practice: Dealing with International,
Transnational, and Foreign Law
Ronald A Brand*
ABSTRACT
This Article addresseshow a lawyer may ethically engage in a
transnationalpracticegiven the currentstructureof state-by-state
bar admission. Part I examines the ethical pitfalls of a
transnationalpractice, including an examination of applicable
APA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This section also
addresses different tests for determining whether a lawyer has
committed the unauthorizedpractice oflaw. PartIII makes use of
examples to illustrate the legal framework for determining
whether a lawyer has committed the unauthorizedpracticeof law.
In PartIV, the authorconcludes by making suggestions for how to
better address the ethical dilemma of transnationallawyers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. law schools realized
that the practice of law had moved beyond local, state-focused rules, and
that the teaching of law required attention to developments on a
national scale. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, law schools
issue glossy brochures and magazines touting themselves as "global law
schools" able to train the "global lawyer." These developments in legal
education parallel developments in the practice of law in the United
States. With greater emphasis on federal legislation in many areas of
the law and harmonization of state law through "uniform" laws
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law, as well as case law that relies heavily on the Restatements of
the American Law Institute, lawyers regularly must look beyond the law
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of their own state to provide competent legal counsel in both
transactional and litigation matters. As private international law
experiences the development of conventions and model laws designed to
harmonize rules world-wide, this process is repeating itself on a global
scale.
While the practice of law has moved from being local to national to
international in scope, the regulation of the profession in the United
States remains largely localized. Admission to the bar is governed by
the state of admission, and a lawyer admitted in one state is a nonlawyer in another state for purposes of the application of rules dealing
with the unauthorized practice of law. Even competent legal advice
regarding federal law matters that are uniformly interpreted throughout
the United States may be the unauthorized practice of law if rendered
from a location outside the state of admission to a client from another
state.
Dynamic changes in the practice of law, combined with the static
system of regulation of that practice, produce significant problems for
lawyers concerned with reconciling a transnational practice with local
admission. Recent cases raise further questions about the relationship
between the duty of competence and rules prohibiting the unauthorized
practice of law. It may be unauthorized practice to advise a client in a
state where the lawyer is not admitted, even if the advice is rendered
competently, while the same advice given to a client from the lawyer's
state of admission would not constitute unauthorized practice. While
cases focus on the location of the lawyer and the client, it is also
important to consider the law being applied. If we do so, however, what
then is the result of the application of foreign country law by a lawyer
admitted in a U.S. state? Lawyers with a transnational practice often
must deal with rules of private international law found in treaties or
with rules created by non-governmental organizations operating on a
global basis. This practice raises the added question of whether existing
ethical rules and case law provide guidance for the transnational lawyer
representing multinational clients engaged in transactions throughout
the world, and applying rules that require reference to documents and
decisions from sources in multiple jurisdictions. These events further
complicate the application of standards dealing with lawyer competence
and with the unauthorized practice of law.
This Article will not attempt to catalogue or address all the ethical
rules that may apply to the transnational practice of law. It will rather
focus on the transactional lawyer and some of the issues faced in
common contractual relationships that cross national borders. To some
extent these issues are mitigated by the fact that other countries apply a
more limited definition of the practice of law, and may be less likely to
sanction a U.S. lawyer applying their law or representing their nationals
as clients. As with other issues of transnational practice, however, a
U.S. lawyer often is required to find guidance, and compelled to
recognize limitations, from cases dealing with interstate practice within

1138

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:1135

our federal system. The ultimate goal of this article is to consider
whether the realities of the practice of law today can be reconciled with
the structure and rules governing those engaged in that practice.

II. MOVING INTO THE WORLD OF TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE
Businesses in today's markets both want and fear transnational
involvement. On the one hand, they want the extra profits and
economies of scale that can come from global markets. At the same time
they seek to avoid the increased uncertainty and risk resulting from the
additional sets of rules that may apply to their conduct in those markets.
Competent legal counsel is thus even more important in a cross-border
transaction than in its domestic counterpart.
This raises two
fundamental questions regarding the lawyer's role in such a transaction:
what is the benchmark by which we measure lawyer competence in such
representation, and what is the threshold beyond which even the most
competent lawyer should not pass in engaging in the practice of law
outside his or her state of admission? The related question, by which we
necessarily must judge our answers to the first two, is: what is the
profession's obligation to a client involved in transnational transactions
in terms of encouraging, allowing, and regulating competent provision of
legal services?
A. The Competent TransnationalLawyer

1. Model Rule 1.1
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct begin with the duty
of competent representation:
Rule 1.1

Competence

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
1
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

The placement of this Rule at the beginning of the Model Rules
emphasizes the importance of the duty owed to the client. The focus of
this duty indicates the fundamental importance of the interests of the
client in the application of all of the Model Rules. The further fact that
this duty can rarely be waived by the client2 underscores its significance
to the attorney-client relationship. Thus, by its very nature, this Rule
provides the fundamental test in the interpretation of every other Model

1.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

2.

Id. R. 1.8(h).
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Rule. No other Rule should be interpreted in a manner that would
result in devaluation of the duty of competence or of its goal of proper
representation of the client, nor should any rule be interpreted in a
manner that accepts any other goal (e.g., protection of the profession)
over this one.
The duty of competent representation does not require that the
lawyer know all the answers to a client's legal questions at the time
representation is undertaken. "A lawyer can provide adequate
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
Competent representation can also be provided through the association
of alawyer of established competence in the field in question."3 Thus, it
is wholly appropriate to develop new areas of competence through
continued study and to associate with other lawyers to provide legal
services on multiple issues. This process should allow satisfaction of the
duty of competence through increased understanding of foreign law, as
well as through association with a foreign lawyer when advice on foreign
law is necessary. 4 The more difficult question is when a lawyer may
rely on his or her own knowledge of foreign law in providing competent
representation.
2. Knowledge of Foreign Law
In the case ofIn re Roel, the New York Court of Appeals stated that
"[w]hen counsel who are admitted to the Bar of this State are retained in
a matter involving foreign law, they are responsible to the client for the
proper conduct of the matter, and may not claim that they are not
required to know the law of the foreign State."5 It is generally
recognized that giving legal advice regarding foreign law does constitute
the practice of law.6 Thus, it would be possible to conclude that one who

3.

Id R. 1.1, cmt. 2.

4.

Moder decisions tend to allow a foreign lawyer to associate with a local lawyer

for such purposes, even though the former is not a "lawyer" for purposes of application of
the unauthorized practice rules of Model Rule 5.5. See, eg., Utah: State Bar Ethics
Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 96-14 (1997), 1997 WL 45139 (advising that a Utah lawyer
may form a partnership with "individuals who are licensed to practice law in any
jurisdiction within the United States or with persons qualified and authorized to engage in
the functional equivalent of U.S. legal practice under the laws of a foreign country.);
Ronald A. Brand, ProfessionalResponsibility in a TransnationalTransactionsPractice,17
J. L. &Co. 301,323 (1998). See also The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Opinion No. 1995-3 (1995),
available at http-/Avww.abcny.org/ethl995b.htm (explaining that a person admitted to
practice law only in a foreign country may be listed as an associate in a New York law
firm's letterhead and other advertising "provided an appropriate disclaimer is included to
set forth the jurisdictional limitations on his or her practice...").

5.
In re Roel, 144 N.E.2d 24, 28 (N.Y. 1957).
6.
See, eg., Bluestein v. State Bar of Cal., 529 P.2d 599, 606 (Cal. 1974)
(explaining that "[ihe practice of law includes legal advice and counsel and the preparation
of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured although such matter
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gives such advice must be admitted to practice, or be offering that advice
through someone who is admitted in the jurisdiction in which the
practice takes place.7 This conclusion, however, is not always borne out
in practice.
In Degen v. Steinbrink, chattel mortgages prepared by a New York
law firm for property in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, were
later found to be invalid for improper preparation and maintenance,
thus leaving the client unprotected. 8 Noting that the firm had in fact
practiced law in three states in one set of transactions, the court stated:
When a lawyer undertakes to prepare papers to be filed in a state foreign
to his place of practice, it is his duty, if he has not knowledge of the
statutes, to inform himself, for, like any artisan, by undertaking the work,
he represents that he is capable of performing it in a skillful manner. Not
to do so, and to prepare documents that have no legal potency, by reason of
their lack of compliance with simple statutory requirements, is such a
negligent discharge of his duty to his client as should render him liable for
9
loss sustained by reason of such negligence.

In Rekeweg v. FederalMut. Ins. Co., an Indiana lawyer filed an action in
Indiana based on Ohio law, but failed to draft a complaint that stated a
proper claim for relief under Ohio law. 10 Because Ohio law clearly
applied under the Indiana conflicts of law rules, the court followed the
New York approach in Degen," determining that a lawyer admitted only
in Indiana can be found negligent for failure to know or ascertain
another state's law, and that such failure is not a defense to a
2
malpractice claim.'
Cases like Roel, Degen, and Rekeweg indicate that lack of
knowledge of foreign state law will not be accepted as a defense to
claims of liability for conduct causing injury to a client. These cases do
not, however, tell us whether it is either appropriate conduct or the
unauthorized practice of law to engage in representation requiring
knowledge of foreign law without obtaining the assistance of foreign
counsel.
A Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance
Committee opinion gave less than a definitive answer to this question

may or may not be depending [sic] in a court," and "gyiving legal advice regarding the law
of a foreign country thus constitutes the practice of law. .. ).
7.

AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining that

[a] lawyer's lack of experience in a particular area of law is no defense to a charge of
incompetent representation; in such cases a lawyer must either work with experienced cocounsel or educate himself or herself appropriately. . . ."). But see Francis Meyrier, Legal
Opinions in FinancialTransactionsInvolving Foreign Law, 13 INT'L Bus. LAW. 410, 411
(Oct. 1985) (suggesting that French lawyers may properly give advice on U.S. law and U.S.
lawyers may give advice on French law).
8.
Degen v. Steinbrink, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 810-13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922)..
9.
Id. at 814.
10.
Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431, 435 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
11.
Degen, 195 N.Y.S. at 814.
12.
Rekeweg, 27 F.R.D. at 436.
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when asked "can a Pennsylvania lawyer represent clients residing in a
foreign state in matters over which the foreign state's court would have
exclusive jurisdiction."13 The opinion noted that the request was not
specific enough to provide a complete opinion, but did state that"[tihere
is nothing uncommon about an attorney licensed in and located in
Pennsylvania dealing with cases that arise under the statutes of various
other states." 14 Although the opinion noted that, given the lack of
specific delineation of the request, the Committee could not provide
specific advice, it went on to state that,
[Slhould the representation of the clients in your scenario be undertaken by
an attorney working out of Pennsylvania, there does not appear to be an
unauthorized practice of law problem in Pennsylvania which would prevent
you from handling this matter. However, each jurisdiction defines the
unauthorized practice of law differently, and the Committee urges you to
determine whether the activity you are contemplating would violate the
15
unauthorized practice of law prohibition in the foreign jurisdiction.

Thus, the opinion suggests that while advising clients on foreign law
may not violate ethical rules in the jurisdiction in which the advice is
given, it might do so in the jurisdiction whose law is being applied.
Some guidance is found in an opinion requested by a Washington,
D.C. firm representing lending institutions outside of Pennsylvania on
whether legal services to the lenders in loan transactions secured by
Pennsylvania property would constitute the unauthorized practice of
law in Pennsylvania. 16 None of the firm's lawyers was licensed to
practice in Pennsylvania. Considering Model Rules 1.1 and 5.5, the
Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility carefully avoided any clear general
authorization or prohibition of the conduct. 17 It did sum up its position,
however, in the following language:
A lawyer licensed in a foreign jurisdiction may travel to Pennsylvania to
negotiate on a foreign client's behalf, where the lawyer does not purport to
be a member of the Pennsylvania bar nor hold himself out as an expert in
the laws of Pennsylvania. It should be noted, however, that the frequency
of this practice and the location of the loan closing(s) may have a bearing
on the result. 18

13.
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n ProFl Guidance Comm., Op. 91-36 (1991), 1991 W'L
325881.
14.
Id.
15.
Id
16.
Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. Leg. Eth. Prof. Resp., Op. 90-02 (1990), 1990
WL 678970.
17.
Id
18.
Id. at *2. There are, however, seemingly conflicting opinions of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, for example, Op.

94-106 (1994) (explaining that "an out-of-state attorney who represents an out-of-state
lending institution lending money to a Pennsylvania resident which loan is secured by a

mortgage on Pennsylvania real estate but which financing settlement is held out-of-state is
not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Pennsylvania.'); Op. 94-105 (1994)
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By focusing in part on the frequency of the practice of Pennsylvania
law by the D.C. firm, the opinion indicated a sort of pro hac vice
approach to transactional representation similar to the more formal
system for litigation representation. This implied authorization for
incidental transactions was limited, however, when the Committee
noted that "the practice that has developed for competent counsel in
many jurisdictions to opine regularly concerning the corporation law of
Delaware has not yet grown to encompass Pennsylvania law,"19 and that
"there is, however, no identifiable standard which in all instances will
provide guidance as to whether it is necessary, or simply wise to secure
the opinion of local counsel in such matters."2 0 Other decisions have
relied on the frequency and significance of the incursion into the state
where the question of unauthorized practice of law arises. They form
part of the foundation for the connection between the duty of competent
representation of the client and the unauthorized practice of law.
B. UnauthorizedPracticeof Law in Cross-BorderTransactions
1. Model Rule 5.5
Rule 5.5 of the Model Rules provides as follows:
Rule 5.5

Unauthorized Practice of Law

A lawyer shall not:
(a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of
the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
21
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.

While this rule carries the heading "unauthorized practice of law," it
does not provide a definition of that term. Instead, comment 1 to this
Rule provides that
The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from
one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice
of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal

(explaining that "an out-of-state [sic] who appears in Pennsylvania at real estate
settlements, whether representing the seller or the buyer and who provides them with
advice on the effect of Pennsylvania Law on the legal aspects of the transaction is engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law in Pennsylvania."); and Op. 94-101 (1994) (explaining
that "ifthere are no rules which permit such admission, [al Court or Commission is without
the ability to authorize the out-of-state attorney to practice law before it"); availableat
httpJ/www.pabar.org/opinions.shtml.
19.
Penn. Bar Ass'n, supra note 16 at *3 (citing James J. Fuld, Legal Opinions in
Business Transactions-AnAttempt to Bring Some OrderOut of Some Chaos, 28 BUS. LAW.
915, 937 (1973)).
20.
Id.
21.

MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 5.5.
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services by unqualified persons. Paragraph (b)does not prohibit a lawyer
from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions
to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains
responsibility for their work. 22

Thus, what amounts to the unauthorized practice of law is to be
determined by each jurisdiction through statutes and case law. The
Rule 5.5 comment provides some guidance as to purpose, however,
limiting any definition to an emphasis on the duty to the client.
Whatever the definition may be, the purpose behind preventing
unauthorized practice is the protection of the client. This is also the
guiding principle behind the Rule 1.1 duty of competence. 23 The
explanation of paragraph (b) in the comment would seem to apply
equally to an out-of-state lawyer retained to provide advice on foreign
law.
2. Incidental and Innocuous Practice in a State by a Foreign Lawyer
One of the most-cited cases on the issue of practice in one
jurisdiction by a lawyer admitted only in another isAppell u. Reiner.24 A
New York lawyer represented a New Jersey resident in working out
creditors' claims, including the claim of a New York City company that
accounted for over fifty percent of the value of all claims.25 When the
lawyer brought suit to collect his fee, the client countered with the
defense that collection for the unauthorized practice of law is
prohibited.2 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that only

22.
Id. cmt. 1.
23.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, R. 1.1 and accompanying text. This goal is
also the focus of the comments to the RESTATEMENTTHIRD LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3
(2000), which takes a progressive approach to the question of cross-border practice:
Applied literally, the old restrictions on practice of law in a state by a lawyer
admitted elsewhere could seriously inconvenience clients who have need of such
services within the state. Retaining locally admitted counsel would often cause
serious delay and expense and could require the client to deal with unfamiliar
counsel. Modem communications, including ready electronic connection to much of
the law of every state, makes concern about a competent analysis of a distant
state's law unfounded. Accordingly, there is much to be said for a rule permitting a
lawyer to practice in any state, except for litigation matters or for the purpose of
establishing a permanent in-state branch office. Results approaching that rule
may arguably be required under the federal interstate commerce clause and the
privileges and immunities clause. The approach of the Section is more guarded.
However, its primary focus is appropriatelyon the needs of the client.
Id. § 3, cmt. e (emphasis added). The Restatement further extends the client relationship
justification of out-of-state practice to inside legal counsel for a corporation, supporting
consistent practice in a state in which the lawyer is not admitted, "because the only concern
is wvith the client-employer, who is presumably in a good position to assess the quality and
fitness of the lawyer's work." Id. cmt. f.
24.
Appell v. Reiner, 204 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1964).
25.
Id.at 147.
26.
Id.
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lawyers admitted in New Jersey could practice law there, but recognized
that, particularly in a geographic area where business dealings were
often likely to cross state lines, some exceptions to a strict rule are
necessary:
[L]egal services to be furnished to New Jersey residents relating to New
Jersey matters may be furnished only by New Jersey counsel. We
nevertheless recognize that there are unusual situations in which a strict
adherence to such a thesis is not in the public interest. In this connection
recognition must be given to the numerous multistate transactions arising
in modern times .... [It follows that there may be instances justifying
such exceptional treatment warranting the ignoring of state lines. This is
such a situation. Under the peculiar facts here present, having in mind the
nature of the services to be rendered, the inseparability of the New York
and New Jersey transactions, and the substantial nature of the New York
claim, we conclude that plaintiffs agreement to furnish services in New
27
Jersey was not illegal and contrary to public policy.
The court made a distinction between a transactional practice and
litigation services, indicating that representation in negotiations and
similar non-court circumstances was more likely to be viewed favorably
than would representation connected with litigation:
It must be remembered that we are not here concerned with any
participation by plaintiff in a court proceeding .... Under the peculiar
circumstances here present, independent negotiations by members of
different bars, even though cooperating to the greatest extent, would be
28
grossly impractical and inefficient.
Even in Spivaks v. Sachs, one of the leading cases refusing to allow
collection of fees by an out-of-state lawyer, the New York Court of
Appeals referred approvingly to the language of Appell:
We agree with the Supreme Court of New Jersey... that, recognizing the
numerous multi-State transactions and relationships of modern times, we
cannot penalize every instance in which an attorney from another State
comes into our State for conferences or negotiations relating to a New York
29
client and a transaction somehow tied to New York.
Like Appell, other cases allowing the collection of fees, as well as
cases refusing to find unauthorized practice, have dealt with limited,
"incidental and innocuous" incursions into legal practice within the nonadmission state. Thus, in El Gemayel v. Seaman, a Lebanese lawyer
could give assistance to New York residents on Lebanese law, when all
of his contacts were by telephone and mall other than a visit to New
York after the completion of his legal services. 30 Similarly, in Freelingv.
Tucker, an Oklahoma lawyer's representation of an heir in an Idaho
probate proceeding was "incident to the disposition of a particular
matter isolated from his usual practice in the state of his residence," and

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329,331 (N.Y. 1965) (citingAppell,204 A.2d 146).
El Gemayel v. Seaman, 533 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1988).
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did not amount to unauthorized practice. 31 And in Goldstein v. Muskat,
an Illinois lawyer who attended a first meeting with an estate's
Wisconsin lawyer, and engaged in further consultations by phone and
mail on probate and tax matters, was not engaged in unauthorized
32
practice in Wisconsin.
Other courts focus less on the extent of the local practice than on
the need in a modern society to allow multijurisdictional representation
for the client's benefit. In In re Estate of Waring, a New York firm had a
long relationship with the decedent and the decedent's business,
represented the decedent's estate in tax and other matters, but was
associated with a local New Jersey firm for court representation and
preparation of the New Jersey inheritance tax filings.33 The New
Jersey court allowed the collection of fees by the New York firm, stating:
Multistate relationships are a common part of today's society and are to be
dealt with in commonsense fashion. While the members of the general

public are entitled to full protection against unlawful practitioners, their
freedom of choice in the selection of their own counsel is to be highly
regarded and not burdened by "technical restrictions which have no
34
reasonable justification.

The court ultimately determined that the New York firm "properly
participated in the handling of the estate and so restricted its activities
as to avoid any fair charge that it was wrongfully practicing law in New
35
Jersey."
The question these cases raise is whether the frequency and
significance of the incursion into another state through limited practice
there relates to the question of competency of the lawyer to engage in
such practice. If our test is the duty of competence owed to the client
under Model Rule 1.1, is a lawyer more or less likely to be acting
competently if he or she applies that state's law (in that state) only on an
infrequent basis. Some commentators have connected this question to
the existence ofjurisdiction over the out-of-state lawyer advising on that
state's law.36 On the one hand, if the conduct is limited and isolated,

31.
32.

Freeling v. Tucker, 289 P. 85, 86 (Idaho 1930).
Goldstein v. Muskat, 114 Wis. 2d 596, 338 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).

See also Cowen v. Calabrese, 41 Cal. Rptr. 441,442-43 (Cal. CL App. 1964) (holding that an
Illinois lawyer who came to California to advise a California client, after being contacted at
his Illinois office, could recover fees for work on a federal bankruptcy matter in California,
where his only practice in California was in federal court); Brooks v. Volunteer Harbor No.
4, 123 N.E. 511, 512 (Mass. 1919) (holding that a Maine lawyer could recover fees for work
for a Massachusetts client performed in Massachusetts, where he had informed the client
that he was not locally admitted and would have to retain local counsel).
33.
In re Estate of Waring, 221 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1966).
34.
Id. at 197.
35.
Id. at 199.
36.
Robert E. Lutz, Ethics and InternationalPractice: A Guide to the Professional
Responsibilities of Practitioners,16 FORDHAii INTL L.J. 53, 60 (1992-93):
When undertaking representation that involves advice on the law of a foreign
country, U.S. lawyers should be wary that foreign countries may consider such
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with clear statements to the client that the lawyer is not licensed to
practice the law of the state in question, and disclaimers as to the ability
to render opinions on the law of that state, then the lawyer may be free
of claims of malpractice and unauthorized practice. At the same time,
however, such conditions may render the representation less than fully
useful to the client. In many cases, practical considerations such as
are violated may prevent
jurisdiction in the state whose practice rules
37
this issue from being directly addressed.
More recently, cases have begun to focus on issues other than the
intensity of the incursion into the state in which the question of
unauthorized practice arises. These cases allow distinctions to be made
based on four factors: (1) the state in which the lawyer involved is
admitted to practice law; (2) the location of the client; (3) the law being
applied in the particular transaction; and (4) the location of the lawyer
when providing the services. The following discussion addresses these
factors, beginning with a closer look at the basic Model Rule dealing
with the unauthorized practice of law.
3. Determining the Relevant Factors
a. Acknowledging the Need for Cross-Border Representation
Whether existing case law provides real guidance on what
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law by an out-of-state lawyer is

advice the unlicensed "practice of law." As a practical matter, it is normally the
lawyer's home jurisdiction that is most likely to bring a disciplinary action against
the member lawyer. Nevertheless, given the reach of some long-arm jurisdictional
statutes as well as the extraterritorial reach of some lawyer regulation codes, legal
services in one country that somehow relate to a transaction in another may subject
a lawyer to the courts and laws of a foreign country.
Id. See also Meyrier, supra note 8, at 411:
[A] French lawyer would not act unlawfully under the laws of France if he gave,
say, a New York law opinion, since (a) the practice of law, as such, whether French
or foreign, is not regulated in France even though the practice of law within any of
the regulated professions (i.e., as avocat, conseiljuridiqueornotaire)is and (b) U.S.
law would not preclude a non-resident lawyer from opining on U.S. law; even if
U.S. law purported to make this unlawful, the extraterritorial effect of such a
prohibition would be questionable.
Id.
37.
See, e.g., Mayes v. Leipziger, 674 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a New
York long-arm statute did not result in jurisdiction over a California lawyer and his firm in
New York, where the lawyer never came to New York, and an instituted representation of
a New York client by sending letters and making phone calls from California to the client's
New York lawyer).
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open to question.3 8 As indicated above, a rather long line of twentieth
century cases provides no clear statements. Those cases do, however,
provide consistent statements regarding the need for lawyers to be able
to provide cross-border representation. Thus, as early as 1965, the New
York Court of Appeals stated that, given "the numerous multi-state
transactions and relationships of modern times, we cannot penalize
every instance in which an attorney from another State comes into our
State for conferences or negotiations relating to a New York client and a
transaction somehow tied to New York" 39 The decision in which this
statement was first made held that a California lawyer could not collect
a fee for services rendered in New York to a New York resident relating
to a Connecticut divorce, because those activities constituted the illegal
practice of law in New York 40 In comparison, when all of a lavryer's
contacts with the client in New York were by telephone from outside
New York, except for a visit to New York following the successful
completion of his legal services, that lawyer did not engage in unlawful
practice in New York_41 While the distinction between these two cases
may be easily accepted-one involved a lawyer licensed in one state who
went to another state, set up an office there, obtained a listing in the
local telephone directory, listed that office as his place of business on his
stationery and professional cards, and represented clients in the courts
of that jurisdiction; the other involved a lawyer who advised only on
foreign law from a foreign 42location-finding the exact location of the
dividing line is not so easy.

See generally Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lauyers to Participate in
38.
MultidisciplinaryPractices:Business as Usualor the End oftie Professionas We Know It?
84 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1339-52 (2000) (discussing whatis included in the practice of law').

El Gemayel, 533 N.E.2d at 248 (quoting Spivak, 211 N.E.2d at 331).
39.
Spivak, 211 N.E.2d at 331.
40.
El Gemayal, 533 N.E.2d at 249.
41.
For cases denying payment of legal fees based on findings of unauthorized
42.
practice, see e.g., Martin & Martin v. Jones, 541 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1989) (estopping a
Mississippi law firm not licensed in Alabama from enforcing a client's promise to pay his
fee for legal services rendered in Alabama); McRae v. Sawyer, 473 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Ala.
1985) (refusing to honor a Mississippi attorney's lien against Alabama clients for
representation in litigation in Alabama courts, even though the Mississippi lawyer had
associated with a local firm); Perlah v. S.E.I. Corp., 612 A.2d 806, 808 (Conn. Cir. CL 1992)
(holding that a lawyer admitted only in New York could not collect fees for representation of
Connecticut client, involving preparation of documents for the acquisition of a New York
corporation by the client's investment group); Taft v. Amsel, 180 A.2d 756 (Conn. Super.
Ct 1962) (preventing a New York attorney from recovering compensation for legal services
rendered primarily in Connecticut for Connecticut residents, involving creation of interstate
transportation business); Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995) (denying

a Massachusetts lawyer, residing in Florida, fee for representation of a Greek seaman in
Jones Act claim for damages on the high seas); Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 362 N.E.2d
1047, 1048-49 (1l. 1977) (denying a Wisconsin lawyer not admitted in Illinois recovery of
legal fees for representing an Illinois client in the sale of Illinois real estate to other Illinois
parties); Shapiro v. Steinberg, 440 N.W.2d 9. 12 (Mich. CL App; 1989) (denying a lawyer
licensed in Massachusetts, who was District Legal Counsel for the Army Corps of Engineers
in Michigan, recovery of fees for legal services in connection with a wrongful death case in
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Additional judicial acknowledgments of the need for cross-border
representation include statements that "[m]ultistate relationships are a
common part of today's society and are to be dealt with in commonsense
fashion," 43 and that strict adherence to rules prohibiting the

unauthorized practice of law by out-of-state attorneys would be "grossly
44
impractical and inefficient."
b. A Focus on the State in Which the Lawyer Delivers Legal Services:
The Significance of the Birbrower Test
The case bringing the most recent discussion is Birbrower,
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, in which the

California Supreme Court stated, "we recognize the need to acknowledge

Michigan, but finding that the attorney could recover for "work of a preparatory nature,
such as research, investigation of details, assemblage of data, and similar activities");
Spivak, 211 N.E.2d at 331 (California lawyer could not collect a fee for services rendered in
New York to a New York resident relating to a Connecticut divorce); Ranta v. McCarney,
391 N.W.2d 161, 166 (N.D. 1986) (denying collection by Minnesota lawyer who had assisted
in sale of business of North Dakota client, where lawyer was not admitted to practice in
North Dakota but had provided legal services to at least 20 North Dakota clients and had a
branch office in North Dakota). For cases involving disciplinary sanctions for similar
"unauthorized" out-of-state practice, see Unauthorized Prac. ofLaw v. Bodhaine, 738 P.2d
376, 377 (Colo. 1987) (granting an injunction against practice in Colorado by a Colorado
resident who was licensed to practice only in California); In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600 (D.C.
1992) (providing a nine-month suspension to a Washington D.C.-admitted lawyer who had
been disciplined for unauthorized practice in Maryland); Brookens v. Comm. on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120 (D.C. 1988) (imposing a fine on lawyer
admitted in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, but not in Washington, D.C., who maintained
offices in Washington, D.C. and appeared on behalf of others in cases in Superior Court,
U.S. District Court and D.C. Court of Appeals); Fla. Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla.
1978) (settling of Florida Bar action to enjoin New York firm from opening Miami office
without supervising partner who was admitted in Florida); In re Carter, 426 S.E.2d 897,
898-99 (Ga. 1993) (disciplining Georgia lawyer for representing a divorce client in Alabama
without being admitted to practice there, where he misrepresented the status of the matter
to the client, withdrew without notifying or taking steps to protect the client, and did not
refund any portion of his fee); Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, Inc., 561 A.2d
200, 213 (Md. 1989) (enjoining lawyer admitted to Washington D.C. Court of Appeals and
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland from continuing practice through law office
in Maryland); In re Roel, 144 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1957) (sanctioning Mexican citizen and
lawyer who had never become member of New York bar, but "maintained offices in the city
of New York for a considerable period of time," from which he arranged Mexican divorces);
In re Ellis, 504 N.W.2d 559 (N.D. 1993) (upholding six-month suspension where lawyer
admitted only in North Dakota represented clients in Minnesota without associating with
local counsel, prepared false documents in order to obtain bank loan to client to payher fee,
and abandoned client when opposing counsel objected to such representation); Ginsburgv.
Kovrak, 139 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1958) (enjoining lawyer not admitted in Pennsylvania from
maintaining Pennsylvania office even though the lawyer's practice was limited to the
practice of federal tax law); S.C. Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Froelich, 377
S.E.2d 306, 308 (S.C. 1989) (granting an injunction against lawyer admitted in Illinois, but
not in South Carolina, who actively participated in medical malpractice litigation in South
Carolina and federal courts).
43.
Waring, 221 A.2d at 197.
44.
Id. (quoting Appell, 204 A.2d at 148).
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and, in certain cases, accommodate the multistate nature of law
practice."45 The New York law firm seeking to collect its fee "performed
substantial work in California," for a California corporation, in
connection with a dispute arising out of an agreement governed by
California law. 46 Most-perhaps all-of this work was related to the

preparation for representation of the California client before an arbitral
tribunal under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and in
the resulting settlement of claims short of actual arbitration. 47 The
court focused on the California statute prohibiting the unauthorized
practice of law, which states that "[no person shall practice law in
8
California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar."
Finding no doubt that the New York law firm had engaged in the
"practice of law," the question was whether it had done so "in
California." 49 The court acknowledged that "Imere fortuitous or
attenuated contacts will not sustain a finding that the unlicensed lawyer
practiced law 'in California," and stated that "[tihe primary inquiry is
whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient activities in the
state, or created a continuing relationshipwith the Californiaclient that
included legal duties and obligations."50 Nonetheless, the court
determined that compensation was to be denied only for that portion of
the services provided "in California" 5 1 The New York firm
may be able to recover fees under the fee agreement for the limited legal
services it performed... in New York to the extent they did not constitute
practicing law in California, even though those services were performed for
a California client. Because [the statute on unauthorized practice of lawI
applies to the practice of law in California, it does not, in general, regulate
52
law practice in other states.

The Birbrowercourt focused on (1) the location of the client, (2) the
applicable law, and (3) the location of the performance of the services,
with primary emphasis on the last of these three elements. Though
clearly indicating that it found this analysis compelled by the language
of the statute, the court set up rather incongruous possibilities. Thus,
the same representation of a California client in the application of
California law would be the unauthorized practice of law if done by a
New York lawyer in California, but may not be if done by the same
lawyer in New York.
While the Birbrowerresult may be grounded in the language of the
California statute, it seems to have little or no relationship to the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Birbrower,949 P.2d at 10.
Id. at 3.
Id.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West Supp. 1998).
Birbrower,949 P.2d at 5.
Id- (emphasis added).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 11.
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purpose of assuring competent legal advice to the California client. If
the advice is competent when rendered in New York, how is it that the
same advice becomes less competent when delivered from a location
within California? If, as noted above, the focus of Model Rule 5.5 on the
unauthorized practice of law is the same as that of Model Rule 1.1-the
duty of competence owed to the client-then the concern should be
whether the representation is competently rendered, regardless of where
it is rendered. Particularly in an age of instantaneous real and virtual
delivery of services from any point on the globe, any focus on where the
lawyer delivers services is only likely to lead to irrelevant legal fictions
applied for the purpose of determining where the electronic transmission
of those services occurs.
The Birbrower decision does apply the factors most courts have
considered in cases involving the unauthorized practice of law. It is
correct that unauthorized practice by a lawyer cannot occur unless it is
"in" a state other than the state of admission. The lawyer is always
authorized to practice law in the state of admission. The real question is
when should practice "in" another state constitute the unauthorized
practice of law. If the local definition of the "unauthorized practice of
law" hinges only on where the lawyer is located, then the rule falls to
take into account the duty of competent representation owed to the
client and risks confirming arguments that the rule exists only to protect
the economic interests of the local bar.
It is possible to consider the degree of connection of each of (1) the
client, (2) the applicable law, and (3) the location of the delivery of the
services to the state of admission as well as to the other state in
question. The problem is that, by focusing on the language of the
California statute, and then pursuing a "plain meaning" analysis, the
Birbrower court arguably gave greatest weight to the third of these
factors, which is the least important, at least if the review of each is to
5 3
be related to the ability to provide competent legal representation.
If statutes regulating the unauthorized practice of law are
distinguished simply by the location of the lawyer at the time of service,
then the argument that such statutes exist only to protect competing
lawyers who are locally admitted holds great weight. If, on the other
hand, the purpose of such statutes is to protect the client from those not
competent to practice law, the focus must necessarily be on the impact
on the client (California legislatures and courts logically should protect
California clients) and on the applicable law (the California bar
examination tests potential lawyers on California law, while the New

53.
The court did acknowledge that "[pihysical presence here is one factor we may
consider in deciding whether the unlicensed lawyer has violated section 6125, but it is by no
means exclusive." Id.at 5.However, after noting that presence can be "by telephone, fax,
computer, or other modern technological means," the court rejected "the notion that a
person automaticallypractices law 'in California' whenever that person practices California
law anywhere, or virtually' enters the state by telephone, fax, e-mail, or satellite." Id. at 6.
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York bar examination does not). What, though, of the multinational
corporation client with operations in multiple U.S. states and multiple
foreign countries? And what of transactions governed by international
law, or at least by some form of transnational law or set of rules?
c. A Focus on the Location of the Client: Estate of Condon, and the ABA
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice
When the California Supreme Court decided Birbrower,it also sent
another case back to the Court of Appeals to be vacated and
reconsidered. In Estate of Condon, a California decedent, Evelyn
Condon, was survived by a son and a daughter, each of whom was
appointed a co-executor.- 4 The son, Michael Condon, lived in Colorado,
and retained to represent him in his role as executor the Colorado firm
that had prepared his mother's will and other documents relating to her
estate plan. 55 Michael Katz, the lawyer at the Colorado firm who
provided the representation, was not a member of the California State
Bar.56 He provided over 315 hours of non-tax-related services on behalf
of the Colorado co-executor of the California estate.57 Of that work, only
10 hours were rendered while Katz was physically present in
California.58 When the California co-executor challenged Katz's petition
for fees as payment for the unauthorized practice of law, the California
Court of Appeals held that Katz did not violate section 6125 of the
Business and Professions Code, 59 and was entitled to payment.6 0
Following the California Supreme Court's opinion in Birbrower,the
Condon court defined the question before it as, "whether an out-of-state
law firm, not licensed to practice law in California, violated section 6125
when it performed legal services by either physically or virtually
entering California on behalf of a Colorado client who was an executor of
a California estate."61 In determining whether the Colorado firm
"practiced law" "in California," the Condon court interpreted the
Birbrowertest to focus not so much on the location of the lawyer when
providing the services as on the location of the client.62
Implicit in the [Birbrowerl courts formulation of the rule is the ingredient
that the client is a "California client," one that either resides in or has its
principal place of business in California ....

In the real world of 1998 we do not live or do business in isolation within
strict geopolitical boundaries. Social interaction and the conduct of

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Estate of Condon, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
Id at 1140-41.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1141 n.2.
Id
CAL. PROF. & BUS. CODE § 6125 (West Supp. 2001).
Condon, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1142.
Id. at 1143 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1145.
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business transcends state and national boundaries; it is truly global. A
tension is thus created between the right of a party to have counsel of his
or her choice and the right of each geopolitical entity to control the
63
activities of those who practice law within its borders.
The Condon court focused on language in the Birbrowerdecision dealing
with the language and purpose of section 6125 to find that the statute
was not meant to protect anyone other than local (California) clients
against the unauthorized practice of law. Thus, "[wihether an attorney
is duly admitted in another state and is, in fact, competent to practice in
California is irrelevant in the face of section 6125's language and
purpose.'" 4 Thus, the court found it "obvious that . . . the client's
residence or its principal place of business is determinative of the
question of whether the practice is proscribed by section 6125."65
By focusing on the location of the client, the Condon court applied a
test as formalistic as the location-of-the-lawyer-when-rendering-services
test of the Birbrower court. It may be that both applications of the
California statute were correct, given the language of that statute.
Nonetheless, the Condon court explicitly extended the formalism and
language of Birbrowerto determine that whether a foreign attorney is
competent in California law "is irrelevant." 66 While this reasoning may
be correct for the purposes of interpreting section 6125 of the California
Business and Professions Code, it should not be correct for the purposes
of determining unauthorized practice generally. Taking the focus off the
question of competence removes the question of unauthorized practice
from the fundamental duty of competent representation and violates the
basic test suggested at the beginning of this article.
The American Bar Association has created a Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice to study the concerns raised by cases such as
Birbrower and Condon.67 In a memorandum issued in late 2000,68 the
Chair of that Commission, consistent with Estate of Condon, took the
position that a lawyer representing a client from his or her home state is
not engaged in unauthorized practice,
[e]ven if the lawyer must construe the law of another state or foreign
country. A lawyer in Illinois whose in-state client asks about a legal
problem in Indiana or in France, and who is competent to advise on

63.
Id. at 1145-46.
64.
Id. at 1146 (quoting Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 8).
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
ABA Website, http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-home.html
(containing
information on the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice).
68.
Memorandum to Bar Leaders from Harriet E. Miers, Chair Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice, Nov. 1,2000, http'/Avww.abaneLorgcpr/mjp-gillers-final-article.html.
Like the Condondecision, the ABA Memorandum puts the focus clearly on the location of the
client, describing a spectrum that begins on one end with the lawyer and client from the same
state, and extends to "the other end of the spectrum, [with] a lawyer who creates a permanent
physical presence (i.e., hangs out a shingle) in a state in which he or she is not admitted, or
who holds himself or herself out as admitted in a state in which he or she is not admitted." Id.
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Indiana or French law, is licensed to do so from his Illinois office. That is

why the Birbrower... lawyers could get paid for work performed in their
69
home stateD.

This position was supported by citation to Estate of Condon, and to the
Hawaii decision in Fought & Co., Inc. v. Steel Engineering& Erection,
Inc. 70 A closer look at Fought, however, leads to another connection

relied upon by the Hawaii court.
d. A Focus on Competent Representation: The FoughtInterpretation of
Birbrower
In Fought & Co., Inc. v. Steel Engineering & Erection, Inc., the
Hawaii Supreme Court considered an application for statutory fees for
the Oregon general counsel who had provided assistance in litigation on
behalf of an Oregon client.71 The Hawaii statute provides that it is:
unlawful for any person, firm, association, or corporation to engage in...
the practice of law,... except and to the extent that the person, firm, or
association is licensed or authorized so to do by an appropriate court,
agency, or office or by a statute of the State or the United States[."12

The court found first that the Oregon counsel was engaged in "the
practice of law" as considered under the statute.73 It then determined
that the question of whether the services covered "were rendered within
the jurisdiction' of the State of Hawaii was one of first impression.7 4
Citing Birbrower for the proposition that "the legal profession should
discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations
upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon
the opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his
choice," 75 the court stated:
[Tihe transformation of our economy from a local to a global one has
generated compelling policy reasons for refraining from adopting an
application so broad that a law firm, which is located outside the state of
Hawai'i, may automatically be deemed to have practiced law "%within the
jurisdiction" merely by advising a client regarding the effect of Hawaii law
or by "virtually entering" the jurisdiction on behalf of a client via
76
"telephone, fax, computer, or other modem technological means."

At this point, the Fought court found no unauthorized practice to exist,
providing a rationale tied to the duty of competence found in Model Rule
1.1:

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Fought & Co., Inc. v. Steel Eng'g & Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487 (Haw. 1998).
Id.
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 605-14 (Michie 1995).
Fought, 951 P.2d at 496.
Id.
Id. (quoting Birbrower,949 P.2d at 6).
Fought, 951 P.2d at 497 (quotingBirbrower, 949 P.2d at 6).
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[A] commercial entity that serves interstate and/or international markets
is likely to receive more effective and efficient representation when its
general counsel, who is based close to its home office or headquarters and is
familiar with the details of its operations, supervises the work of local
counsel in each of the various jurisdictions in which it does business.
Undoubtedly, many Hawaii corporations follow the same practice.
A blanket rule that prohibited the taxation of fees for the services by
extrajurisdictional legal counsel who assist local counsel in the conduct of
litigation, who are themselves domiciled in different jurisdictions, would be
an imprudent rule at best. At a minimum, this rule would be to increase
the total cost of legal representation and magnify the difficulty of
controlling multijurisdictional litigation. Moreover, such a rule might also
create an incentive for ethical violations, inasmuch as Hawaii Rules of
Professional Conduct (HRPC) Rule 1.1 mandates that 1[a] lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client." In many instances involving
complex litigation among parties domiciled in different jurisdictions,
competent representation undoubtedly requires consultation with legal
counsel licensed to practice in another jurisdiction. To prohibit an award of
fees for these services would only undermine the policies underlying HRS
§§ 605-14 and 605-17, which were enacted to protect the public against
77
incompetence.

The Hawaii court found no unauthorized practice "within the
jurisdiction" of Hawaii, and thus no restriction on the collection of
statutory fees. 78 Its rationale, however, differed from that in Birbrower,
Condon, and the ABA Multijurisdictional Commission memorandum as
a result of the clear reliance on Model Rule 1.1 and the focus on the duty
of competent representation of the client. This factor played no explicit
role in Birbrower or Condon, as reflected by the statement in each
finding "irrelevant" whether the out-of-state attorney was "competent to
79
practice in California."

III. TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE AND COMPETENT REPRESENTATION OF
THE CLIENT: WHEN IS OUT-OF-STATE PRACTICE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE?

While states undoubtedly have the power to regulate the practice of
law under the United States constitutional system, that power should be
exercised consistent with appropriate goals and not simply to protect the
local profession.80 Thus, while the California court's application of the

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 497-98.
Birbrower,949 P.2d at 8; Condon, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 1145.
See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979):
Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers
has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within
their respective jurisdictions. The States prescribe the qualifications for
admission to practice and the standards of professional conduct. They also
are responsible for the discipline of lawyers.
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unauthorized practice of law statute in Birbrowermay be an appropriate
exercise of judicial restraint in the interpretation of particularly
restrictive statutory language, the result indicates at least the need for a
legislative reexamination of the rule. If the test ofwhether conduct is or
is not an unauthorized practice of law must hinge on the place in which
the services are rendered, or even on the location of the client, then the
relationship to the goal of competent representation can become rather
attenuated.
In the discussion above, the important factors in determining
whether there is unauthorized practice of law in a multijurisdictional
context are: (1) the state in which the lawyer involved is admitted to
practice law; (2) the location of the client; (3) the law being applied in
the particular transaction; and (4) the location of the lawyer when
providing the services. 8 ' The first of these, by definition, will always
exist in a multijurisdictional unauthorized practice analysis, but will
never be controlling in the result. Thus, determining whether
unauthorized practice exists must be guided by reference to one or more
of the other three factors, and perhaps by its relation to the state of
admission. As already noted, Birbrower focused on the location of the
lawyer, and Condron focused on the location of the client. The above
discussion suggests that neither of these serves as a satisfactory factor
for determining in all cases whether there exists the unauthorized
practice in multijurisdictional representation. The Fought case adds
reference to the relevant fundamental test: the impact on the ability to
provide competent representation of the client.82 This test is general in
nature, though, and begs the question of what factors are most relevant
to determining whether the test is met. Set forth below are hypothetical
examples of common cross-border transactions, offered to test the
application of the client location, lawyer location, and applicable law
factors in determining whether there exists unauthorized practice of
law. This review of possibilities is offered neither to justify an existing
thesis regarding correct results, nor to develop such a thesis. It is
offered merely to demonstrate problems and inconsistencies with
existing approaches to the relevant issues. While this may be
intellectually less than satisfying, it does indicate the complexity of the
problem given the current structure of the ethical rules.

Id But see Laurel Terry, GATS'Applicability to TransnationalLauweringandits Potential
Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lauyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989 (raising the
issue of whether the power to license and regulate lawyers is exclusively a state power).
81.
See supra p. 1146.
82.
Fought, 951 P.2d at 495-97.
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A. Example 1
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in
Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in
Munich. The contract drafted by Joe Lawyer includes the following clause:
This contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Pennsylvania, excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods. Any dispute arising out of this
contract shall be submitted exclusively to the courts of the State of
Pennsylvania.
Joe Lawyer, admitted in Pennsylvania, is practicing Pennsylvania law,
in Pennsylvania, for a Pennsylvania client. The relevant factors can be
summarized as follows:
state of admission
applicable law
location of conduct
location of client

=
=

=

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

Clearly there is no unauthorized practice of law problem.
B. Example 2
Hilda Rechtsanwalt, admitted to practice in Munich, represents a
Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in Munich. The contract,
drafted by Hilda Rechtsanwalt in Pittsburgh, includes the following clause:
This contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Pennsylvania, excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods. Any dispute arising out of this
contract shall be submitted exclusively to the courts of the State of
Pennsylvania.
Hilda, admitted in Germany, is practicing Pennsylvania law, in
Pennsylvania, for a Pennsylvania client.
This combination is
represented as follows:
state of admission
applicable law
location of conduct
location of client

=
-

=
=

Germany
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

Clearly there is an unauthorized practice of law problem, at least if we
accept the analysis of a majority of the cases.
The question, then, is what adjustments from either end of the
spectrum cause the line between authorized and unauthorized practice
to be crossed. Most cases available in the United States involve inbound
situations in which the lawyer is from outside the state in which the
unauthorized practice of law rule is applied. The same analysis can be
applied, however, to outbound situations, determining whether the
unauthorized practice occurs in the other state.
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C. Example 3
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in
Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in
Munich. Joe goes to Munich, where he negotiates all aspects of the
contract for the sale of widgets to the Munich buyer, including the following

clause:
This contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Pennsylvania, excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods. Any dispute arising out of this

contract shall be submitted exclusively to the courts of the State of
Pennsylvania.

Joe Lawyer, admitted in Pennsylvania, is practicing Pennsylvania law,
for a Pennsylvania client, but he is doing it in Germany. This
combination of factors is represented as follows:
state of admission
applicable law
location of conduct
location of client

=

=
=

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Germany
Pennsylvania

Is there, or should there be, an unauthorized practice of law problem?
Does the mere change of Joe's location convert the authorized practice of
the law in Example 1 into the unauthorized practice of that law? It
would seem not, even if a strict reading of Birbrower (focusing on the
location of the attorney when the services are rendered) might imply a
problem. This example is in line with Condon. It provides a focus on
the location of the client, as well as an emphasis on the applicable law,
and thus dearly ties Joe to the state in which he is admitted to practice.
Joe is every bit as competent to practice the law of his admission state
when he is in Munich as when he is in Pittsburgh. Normal
transnational business relations require that Joe be able to go to the
location of the buyer on behalf of his client and negotiate the contract in
a manner that best protects his client's interests.
D. Example 4
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in
Pittsburgh, represents a Munich client who has come to Pittsburgh to buy

widgets from a Pittsburgh seller. The contract drafted by Joe Lawyer
includes the follovring clause:
This contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Pennsylvania, excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods. Any dispute arising out of this

contract shall be submitted exclusively to the courts of the State of
Pennsylvania.

Joe Lawyer, admitted in Pennsylvania, is practicing Pennsylvania law,
in Pennsylvania, but now for a German client. This combination of
factors is represented as follows:
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applicable law
location of conduct
location of client

=

=
=

=
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Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Germany

Is there, or should there be, an unauthorized practice of law problem?

The Condon focus on the location of the client might suggest a problem,
if Joe were applying the law of a state other than that of his admission.
The mere change of Joe's client from local to foreign should not by itself
convert authorized practice to unauthorized practice. Nor should it
move the matter outside the scope of the duty of competent
representation.
German clients deserve the same quality of
representation in Pennsylvania that is available to Pennsylvania clients.
While regulation of the profession may protect local citizens, even
though both Birbrowerand Condon explicitly found that the California
statute was intended to protect only California clients,8 3 such statutes
reasonably should protect all possible clients, regardless of their
nationality or place of business. If the goal of the rules of practice is to
provide competent representation to the client, then local lawyers must
be allowed to represent foreign clients in the application of local law.
Otherwise competent representation of such clients would not be
possible. It is important to note at this stage, however, that this
analysis changes the focus from the location of the client (as in Condon)
to the applicable law. It may be that unauthorized practice is avoided if
eitherthe client is located in, or the applicable law is that of, the state in
which the lawyer is admitted to practice. Additional examples help
provide further focus.
E. Example 5
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in
Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in
Munich. As part of the negotiations conducted in Pittsburgh, the parties
agree to the following clause in the contract:
This contract shall be governed by the laws of Germany, excluding the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods. Any dispute arising out of this contract shall be submitted
exclusively to the courts of Germany.

Now Joe Lawyer, admitted in Pennsylvania, is representing a
Pennsylvania client, but he is advising on a contract governed by
German law. This combination of factors is represented as follows:

83.

state of admission

=

Pennsylvania

applicable law

=

Germany

location of conduct
location of client

=

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

=

See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
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If the Birbrower approach is followed, then the question becomes
whether Joe Lawyer is practicing German law in Germany. Joe has
never set foot in Germany as a result of the transaction. If the test of
unauthorized practice hinges on where Joe practices law, or where his
client is located, then he clearly is safe. On the other hand, if the focus
is on what law Joe is practicing, then the issue is different; Joe may
know nothing about German law. If this is the case, then he is not
competent to render legal advice on the transaction. He may have
helped create a contract that imposes obligations on his client far
different from those that would exist under Pennsylvania law.
Choice of forum and choice of law clauses are commonly negotiated
terms in transnational contracts, and the simple approach is to choose
the law and courts of one party or the other. If Joe has been involved in
all aspects of the negotiations, and the last clauses agreed upon in
rather difficult negotiations are the choice of forum and choice of law
clauses, must he then decline further representation of his client? Does
Model Rule 1.1 now require at least that he either become familiar with
German law or obtain German co-counsel to advise on the implications
of the relevant clauses? The Restatement, in its comments to the
Section 3 rules on where a lawyer may practice, supports the ability of a
lawyer to give advice on foreign law when competent to do so:
[A] lawyer conducting activities in the lawyer's home state may advise a

client about the law of another state, a proceeding in another state, or a
transaction there, including conducting research in the law of the other

state, advising the client about the application of that law, and drafting
legal documents intended to have legal effect there. There is no per se bar
against such a lawyer giving a formal opinion based in whole or in part on
the law of another jurisdiction, but a lawyer should do so only if the lawyer
84
has adequate familiarity with the relevant law.

84.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNMfG LANERS § 3 cmt. e (2000)
(emphasis added). Section 3 of the Restatement reads as follows:

Jurisdictional Scope of the Practice of Law by a Lawyer
A lawyer currently admitted to practice in a jurisdiction may provide
legal services to clients:
(1)

at any place within the admitting jurisdiction;

(2)

before a tribunal or administrative agency of another
jurisdiction or the federal government in compliance with
requirements for temporary or regular admission to

practice before that tribunal or agency;, and
(3)

Id. § 3

at a place within ajurisdiction in which the lawyer is not
admitted to the extent that the lawyer's activities arise
out of or are otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer's
practice under Subsection (1) or (2).
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This comment adds that "it would be inappropriate for a lawyer to set up
an office for the general practice of nonlitigation law in a jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is not admitted." 85 Like Birbrower, it provides a
primary focus on the location of the conduct. In determining where on
the spectrum of activities the threshold of unauthorized practice lies, the
Restatement comment suggests a test based on whether the activities in
the foreign state "arise out of or otherwise reasonably relate to the
lawyer's practice in a state of admission," then provides a list of factors
to be considered in determining what might meet this reasonable
relationship test.86 After doing so, however, it then suggests that "[tihe
customary practices of lawyers who engage in interstate law practice is
one appropriate measure of the reasonableness of a lawyer's activities
out of state."8 7 It is not clear whether a lawyer whose conduct is not
reasonable when judged by the multiple factors listed can prove
otherwise by demonstrating customary practice consistent with that
conduct.
F. Example 6
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in
Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in
Munich. Joe drafts the contract for the transaction, which includes the
following clause:
This contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Pennsylvania, excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods. Price-delivery terms included in
any documents which make up a part of this contract shall be
governed by the Incoterms 2000, as created by the International
Chamber of Commerce. Any dispute arising out ofthis contract shall
be submitted exclusively to the courts of the State of Pennsylvania.
Now, Joe Lawyer, admitted in Pennsylvania, is practicing Pennsylvania
law, in Pennsylvania, for a Pennsylvania client. He also is practicing a
set of rules created by a non-governmental organization headquartered
in Paris, France. This set of factors can be represented as follows:
state of admission

85.
86.

Pennsylvania

Id.
This list includes:

[W]hether the lawyer's client is a regular client of the lawyer or, if a new client, is
from the lawyer's home state, has extensive contacts with that state, or contacted
the lawyer there; whether a multistate transaction has other significant
connections with the lawyer's home state; whether significant aspects of the
lawyer's activities are conducted in the lawyer's home state; whether a significant
aspect of the matter involves the law of the lawyer's home state; and whether either
the activities of the client involve multiple jurisdictions or the legal issues involved
are primarily either multistate or federal in nature.
87.

Id.
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=

location of conduct
location of client

=
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Pennsylvania & ICC
Incoterms

=

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

Should the application of a non-governmental set of rules make a
difference? One approach is to recognize that incorporation of the
Incoterms is simply an alternative to including multiple pages in the
contract that the parties (i.e., their lawyers) could have written out
themselves. Thus, for all practical purposes this is no different than
having a longer contract otherwise governed by Pennsylvania law. This
carries some logic, but the same could be said of the contract in Example
5 governed by German law. The parties could have drafted into the
contract a set of pages setting out the same rules as exist in German
law. What then is the role of a choice of law clause in relation to the
unauthorized practice of law question? Is a lawyer "practicing" the law
of a given state simply as a result of inclusion of a choice of law clause in
a contract pointing to the laws of that state? If so, does the fact that this
practice does not occur "in" that state really make a difference? What
should be the determining factor in assessing the conduct of the lawyer?
G. Example 7
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in

Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to the
government of the sovereign state of Ruritania. Joe drafts the contract for
the transaction, which includes the following clause:
This contract shall be governed by international law where applicable,
and in all other events by the laws of the State of Pennsylvania,
excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods. Any dispute arising out of this contract
shall be submitted exclusively to the courts of the State of
Pennsylvania.

Joe Lawyer, admitted in Pennsylvania, is now practicing in
Pennsylvania, for a Pennsylvania client, but he is practicing
Pennsylvania law and international law. This combination of factors is
represented as follows:
state of admission
applicable law

=
=

location of conduct
location of client

=

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania & International
Law
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

While international law normally deals with the relationships between
states, and not between private parties, it is well-settled that in
agreements between a state and a private party, the contract may
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include a clause choosing international law.88 International law
includes rules dealing with state responsibility to nationals of other
states, and those rules may be applicable in such a transaction. It is also
clear in the United States that domestic courts can (and must)
determine and apply international law where it applies.8 9
Is Joe now practicing law he is not admitted to practice? When he
took the bar examination in Pennsylvania, there were no questions on
international law. Then again, admission to practice in the other state
involved likely would not involve any test of competence in international
law either. Should a court faced with a claim of unauthorized practice
somehow test Joe's knowledge of international law? There is no official
organ that certifies anyone to practice international law before the
courts of any state, or any other tribunal.90 How do (or should) we deal

with this type of situation? Is it merely a question of competence under
Model Rule 1.1, or does it also implicate Rule 5.5 on the unauthorized
practice of law?
H. Example 8
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in
Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in
Munich. The contract drafted by Joe Lawyer includes the following clause:
This contract shall be governed by the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and, to the extent said
Convention does not cover the issue in question, by the laws of the
State of Pennsylvania. Any dispute arising out of this contract shall
be submitted exclusively to the courts of the State of Pennsylvania.

Now Joe Lawyer is practicing in Pennsylvania, for a Pennsylvania
client.

The law is found in an international convention, but under

88.
See, e.g., F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 191-95 (1973), quoted in
Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California
Asiatic Oil Co. and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 14 (1978)
("the fact that one party is not a State should not prevent the contract from being submitted
to public international law.").
See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895)
89.
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including not only
questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called
the law of nations, but also questions arising under what is usually called private
international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons
within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public,
done within the dominions of another nation-is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice, as often as such questions
are presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their
determination.
Id.
90.
Herbert Briggs, who argued four cases before the International Court ofJustice,
had no law degree and was not admitted to any bar. Stephen M. Schwebel, Comment,
Herbert W. Briggs (1900-1990), 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (1990).
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Article VI of the U.S. Constitution it is the supreme law of the land,9 '

and thus the law of Pennsylvania.
represented as follows:

This combination of factors is

state of admission

=

Pennsylvania

applicable law
location of conduct
location of client

=

CISG and Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

=

=

Under Article 6 of the U.N. Sales Convention, 92 even though parties may
opt out of the Convention's rules by agreement, a mere choice of
Pennsylvania law would not accomplish this goal because of the impact
of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. The Sales Convention, in Article
7, requires that those applying the Convention have "regard ... to its

international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application."9 3 Thus, proper application of the Sales Convention may
require an understanding of how its provisions have been interpreted in
the courts of other contracting states. If cases exist interpreting the
relevant Sales Convention provisions in Germany, Italy, and Mexico,
must Joe Lawyer be conversant with those cases or risk violating the
duty of competence under Rule 1.1? The answer probably is yes.9- If
Joe Lawyer is not conversant with those cases, is he engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law? Probably not. A Condon analysis would
provide a shield because he is representing a client from the state in
which he is admitted to practice and practicing within that state. Thus,
existing case law, 95 as well as the position of the Restatement 96 and the
ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, 97 support the position
that he is not engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
I. Example 9
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in

Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in
Munich. Joe drafts the contract for the transaction, including the folloving
clause:
This contract shall be governed by the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Any dispute arising out
of this contract shall be submitted exclusively to the courts of
Germany.

91.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
92.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex 1, English Version reprinted in 52
Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) and 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Convention on Contracts].
93.
U.N. Convention on Contracts, art. 7(1), 19 I.L.M. at 673.
Harry MVFlechtner, Another CISG Case in the U.S. Courts: Pitfalls for the
94.
Practitionerand the Potentialfor Regionalized Interpretations,15 J.L. & COM. 127, 132
(1995).
95.
See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
96.
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
97.
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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This situation involves a Pennsylvania lawyer, representing a
Pennsylvania client, from a Pennsylvania office. The law being applied
emanates from an international convention, but is the law of both
Pennsylvania and of Germany. This set of factors is represented as
follows:
state of admission
applicable law
location of conduct
location of client

=

=

Pennsylvania
CISG (to be interpreted
by German courts)
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

The venue selection clause will result in the interpretation and
application of the CISG in Germany. At least until a dispute arises and
representation before a German court is required, this situation should
be no different than the application of the Sales Convention in a U.S.
court (except to the extent that differing local or regional interpretations
98
of the Sales Convention may develop).
Example 9A. Consider Example 9 further, assuming that Joe
Lawyer conducts all of the activity related to the transaction in Munich.
Now we have a Pennsylvania lawyer, representing a Pennsylvania
client, but doing it in Munich and applying German law (although that
law may be the same as Pennsylvania law). This set of factors is
represented as follows:
state of admission
applicable law

Pennsylvania
CISG (to be interpreted
by German courts)
Germany
Pennsylvania

location of conduct
location of client

Does this change the analysis at all? If the ultimate test is competent
representation, it should not matter that Joe is in Pennsylvania or
Munich when he provides the services to the Pennsylvania client. In
today's world of easy travel, it is also quite possible that the events could
occur in either place.
Example 9B. Again consider the same facts, adding that the client
is from Munich. Now we have a Pennsylvania lawyer, representing a
German client, in Germany, and applying law that may be the same in
both Germany and Pennsylvania. This set of factors is represented as
follows:
state of admission
applicable law

=
=

location of conduct
location of client

=
-

Pennsylvania
CISG (to be interpreted
in Germany)
Germany
Germany

This gets us to the Birbower combination of factors. But the change
from the last paragraph (a different client) does little to affect the level

98.

See Flechtner, supra note 94, at 134-37.
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of competence of the lawyer or of the quality of the representation
provided. Under Condon, if the location of the client is the "determining
factor,"9 9 then this change should matter. But does it change the quality
of the representation in a manner that justifies this conclusion if
examples 9 and 9A lead to opposite conclusions?
J. Example 10
There is a final situation worth considering that takes into account
the common use of arbitration clauses in international commercial
contracts. This example also allows discussion of further elements of the
Birbrower decision:
Joe Lawyer, admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, with his office in
Pittsburgh, represents a Pittsburgh client selling widgets to a buyer in
Munich. Joe drafts the contract for the transaction, including the follovng
clause:
This contract shall be governed by the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Any dispute arising out
of this contract shall be submitted to arbitration under the rules ofthe

International Chamber of Commerce, with the arbitration to be held in
Paris, France.

This example is the same as example 9, except that now, instead of
submission to the German courts, we have agreement to submit to
arbitration in Paris.
state of admission

Pennsylvania

applicable law

CISG (ICC arbitration
in Paris)

location of conduct
location of client

=
=

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

At the transaction stage, this may create no problems, so long as Joe can
demonstrate competence in the Sales Convention and so long as the
choice of ICC arbitration in Paris is not for some reason a negligent
decision.
In Birbrower,the services performed by the New York law firm on
behalf of the California client, in California, applying California law,
were primarily services in preparation for arbitration proceedings that
ultimately were not required. 10 0 The court, however, treated arbitration
in California as no different than litigation in California. 0 1 It is
interesting to note, however, that a California statute specifically
°2
provided a different answer if the arbitration had been international,1

99.
Condon, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1142; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
100.
Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 7.
101.
Id. at 9.
102.
Id. at 7; CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-1299.9 (West 2001) (providing an
exception to the unauthorized practice of law statute for arbitration and conciliation of
international commercial disputes).
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and that the California legislature responded to the Birbrowerdecision
by providing a pro hac vice type of exception for domestic arbitration,
limited to attorneys admitted to practice elsewhere in the United
103
States.
The statutory change in California is an appropriate recognition of
the importance of arbitration in commercial disputes. When arbitration
is selected in a transnational contract, a common approach is to select a
neutral forum for the arbitration simply to avoid giving either party the
"home court advantage." If doing so then requires that local counsel in
that forum be retained, should a dispute arise, some of the basic benefits
of arbitration are lost, and the lawyers familiar with the transaction on
behalf of each of the parties are rendered unable to provide
representation before a tribunal for which they can select both the
procedural rules and the substantive law. Thus, arbitration justifies
different considerations in the application of both the duty of competent
representation and the question of unauthorized practice of law.

IV. CONCLUSION
A review of recent state court decisions on multijurisdictional
practice and the unauthorized practice of law indicates a lack of
guidance in determining factors that may help avoid potential problems.
A lawyer practicing within his or her own state of admission seems safe,
regardless of whether it is home state or foreign law that is being
applied, and regardless of the location of the client. Even a lawyer
making minor incursions into a foreign state seems safe when acting on
behalf of a client from his or her home state, once again regardless of the
law being applied. The problem comes with a lawyer practicing foreign
law, in the foreign state, on behalf of a foreign client. Short of this
ultimate situation, we must await further legislative and judicial
development of the law. Several observations are possible, however.
They include the following:
1) The focus of any inquiry about multijurisdictional practice should be
on the competent representation of the client.
2)

A formalistic focus on the location of the client or of the lawyer when
providing services should not control the disciplinary regulation of the
lawyer.

3)

A focus on the applicable law properly raises the question of
competence and should be an important factor in determining whether
unauthorized practice has occurred.

4)

A lawyer who can prove competence should be able to practice foreign
law at least when representing clients from the lawyer's state of
admission.

103.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West 2001).
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5)

Lawyers must be able to practice internationally;, the harmonizing
effect of private international law conventions will enhance the
likelihood of lawyer competence in such practice.

6)

When dispute resolution occurs before tribunals without sovereign
authority that are chosen by the parties, the location of the tribunal
should not matter in judging the conduct of the lawyer.
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As further development in this area occurs, there is a need for
decisions more clearly focused on the purpose of the law being applied.
Both the Birbrower and Condon decisions explicitly state that the
California statute is designed to protect only California clients from the
unauthorized practice of law, and thus has no application to a situation
where a client from outside of California might be in need of
protection. 10 4 The Hawaii court in Fought,on the other hand, suggests a
relationship between the question of unauthorized practice and the
Model Rule 1.1 duty of competent representation, even as applied to a
client from another state.10 5 In either event, it does seem that if it is the
client that is being protected by the rule, then the ultimate question is
whether the lawyer is competent to provide the counsel in question. If
only local clients are protected, then the analysis is simplified and,
consistent with Birbrowerand Condon, a court can dismiss charges of
unauthorized practice against foreign lawyers representing clients from
their home states. This approach only avoids any direct examination of
the question of competent representation, however, and risks the
appearance that the real purpose of the rule is to protect the local bar
from competition. It also does not extend easily to the mobile or
multinational client who relies on a single lawyer or law firm.
Perhaps the aspect of multijurisdictional representation least
illuminated by existing decisions is the relationship of unauthorized
practice rules to the law being applied by the lawyer in question. Thus,
in Condon, the Colorado lawyer applying California law did not engage
in unauthorized practice (in California), so long as he did so only for a
Colorado client. Similarly, the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional
Practice considers a lawyer admitted in one state to be "licensed" to
practice the law of any other state or country (so long as he or she is
competent to advise on the law of that state or country) from an office in
the state of admission. 1 6 This approach provides comfort to the
multijurisdictional lawyer who never leaves his home office, but that
seems a bit unrealistic in today's world. The idea that a lawyer is likely
to be more competent to practice the law of a foreign state if he or she
never goes to the foreign state is at best counter-intuitive.
It remains difficult to determine a single factor, or any coordinated
combination of factors, that provides guidance in determining the
existence of unauthorized practice in the multijurisdictional context It
104.
105.
106.

Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5; Condon, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1144-46.
Fought, 951 P.2d at 497.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text
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may be that transnational lawyers are safer in this regard because of the
more limited definition of practice of law outside the United States. It is
easy, however, to find discomfort in rules applied on the basis simply of
the location of the lawyer providing the services or the location of the
client, especially if one is interested in the relationship between the
question of unauthorized practice and the lawyer's basic duty of
competent representation of the client. When representation extends to
areas of law not tested by any state in permitting admission to the bar,
including international and transnational law, we are left at best with
ad hoc determinations of competence.

